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For many years, the relationship between ownership structure, dividends structure, and firm 
performance are considered key areas of study in the field of Corporate Governance, to ensure 
the best performance and diminish agency costs, ownership structure is one of the main 
governance tools along with other factors such as board, leverage, motivation-based payment, 
dividends, and assurance services. Many studies revealed the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance such as Morck et al., (2000). While previous studies have found 
that there is a need to provide more evidence on the linkage between a firm’s performance and 
dividends. The payout decision is materially considered by both shareholders and executives 
(Baker & Powell, 1999; Ajanthan, 2013;  Azeez & Latifat, 2015). Dividends payout is usually 
emerged from the firm’s earnings, performance and cash flow (Ahmed & Javid, 2009). 
Dividends policy is important because it determines the payout, retained earnings ratio, and 
performance.  Firm performance, in this instance, can be presented as to how better a firm 
maximizes its investor’s wealth and the generating earnings from the investments by investors. 
(Baker & Powell, 2001). 
 
Some previous studies have different proposals about the positive relationship between payouts 
and future share prices, such as (Dhanani, 2005), while others; such as (Farsio et al., 2004) argue 
that dividends do not have an illustrative impact to forecast future performance. Few studies 
have addressed the impact of ownership structure and dividends payout policies collectively on 
firm's performance in the Middle East countries. Our study may be considered one of the 
entrepreneur studies which address Jordan as a developing country.  
 
This study aims to provide empirical evidence from Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) to address 
the impact of ownership structure and dividends on firm’s performance of Jordanian 
Manufacturing firms listed on (ASE). A sample of listed firms over the recent six-year period 
(2010-2015) was selected. Data was processed from the financial statements of the sample. 
Many works of literature have measured the firm's performance in different manners; Khamees, 
et al. (2014) only implemented (ROA) and (Tobin's Q), While (Murekefu and Ouma (2012) run 
(NPAT) Margin, Amidu (2007) used (ROA), (ROE), and (Tobin’s Q) as a robustness check. 
Shu-Ching & Wenching (2006), measured the performance by running (ROA), (EPS), (NPM) 
and (ROE). Nadia (2004) used the accounting measurement (ROA). Holderness et al., (1999). 
Himmelberg et al. (1999), Cho (1998), Loderer and Martin (1997), Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991), McConnell and Servaes (1990), all used (Tobin’s Q) as a proxy for performance 
measurement.  
 
In order to diagnose and address the differences in results when running each measurement of 
the above measures; our study is going to use (Tobin’s Q) in addition to other relevant 
accounting measures (ROA, ROE, and NPM) as interpreters of firm’s performance. 
   
The outcomes of this study are anticipated to be valuable to many involved parties, such as; 
investors, finance directors, and academic sides. When making an investment decision and 
portfolio management, developing a dividends policy, and adds more to the existing accounting 
and financial literacy. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section two provides 
problem definition, Section three provides literature reviews and hypotheses development, 
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section four presents methodology used in data collection and analysis; the fifth one discusses 




Ownership structure, dividends policies, and firm's performance are essential fields of research in 
the area of corporate governance and agency theory. 
 
A Jordanian study by Jaafar and El-Shawwa (2009) found a relationship between performance 
and ownership concentration, board size, and multiple directorships performance respectively. 
Another study was conducted in Bahrain by Khamees et al., (2015) used (ROA) and (Tobin's Q) 
revealed that dividends and institutional ownership positively affect performance. Also; Morck et 
al. (2000) supported that the firm’s value rises when management ownership increases. Other 
studies found that ownership structure is insignificant in interpreting firm’s performance      
(Domsetz and Villalonga 2001). There are not any clear pieces of evidence provided by the 
association between Ownership structure, dividends payout and firm’s performance in Jordan; 
while there are many previous kinds of literature from developed economies have focused on the 
association between those factors; therefore, this study is looking for filling this gap in the 
literature by empirically examining the impact of Ownership structure and Dividend Payout on 
the Firm's performance in Jordan.  
  
Thus; this study will use the following four performance measures; (Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and 
NPM) as interpreters of the performance of manufacturing companies listed on ASE. 
 
The study may provide answers to the following two main questions:  
 
1. Is there any impact of ownership structure on firm’s performance? 
2. Is there any impact of dividends on firm’s performance? 
3. Which performance measure is the most representative as a proxy for the firm’s performance? 
 
Also; the study aims to provide empirical evidence on the following question:  
 
4. Is there any impact of control variables on the firm’s performance? 
 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Ownership structure and Firm’s Performance  
 
The relationship between a firm's performance and ownership structure and measured by 
ownership concentration and management ownership has been studied by many types of 
research. McConnell and Servaes (1990) found a significant positive relationship among Tobin’s 
Q as a measure of a firm’s performance and institutional investors.  
Morck et al. (1988), Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), Chen et al. (2005), Vein, Krivogorsky 
(2006), Cornett et al. (2008) found a significant relationship between ownership structure and 
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firm performance. Jaafar & El-Shawwa (2009) found that ownership concentration has a positive 
relationship with performance; While other studies found the opposite (Cho, 1998), (Reyana and 
Valdes, 2012), and (Wahla et al., 2012) revealed a negative relation. Other studies also found 
that increased management, concentrated ownership, and payouts regularly increase firm value 
(Morck et al., 2000; Sarac, 2002; Arnott & Asness, 2003; Berger, 2003;Sulong & Nor, 2008).  A 
study conducted in Bahrain by Khamees et al., (2015) used (ROA) and (Tobin's Q); revealed that 
Institutional ownership had a positive effect on performance when using T'Q while it had a 
negative insignificance effect when using ROA.  
 
Based on the presented literature review, we could develop the following hypothesis in order to 
report on the Impact of Ownership Structure on Firm’s Performance, by applying the four 
suggested measures of Firm’s Performance (Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and NPM). 
 
H01: There is no any impact of ownership structure on the performance of Jordanian 
manufacturing companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. 
 
Dividends Payout and Firm Performance  
 
Many studies tried to address issues concerning the dividend payout policy and their proposed 
impact on a firm’s performance. Studies conducted by Miller and Rock (1985) argued that 
dividend policy plays a major role in predicting the firm's value which enhances shareholders 
wealth. Other studies provided that dividend payout has a significant impact on a firm’s 
performance (Zeckhauser & Pound 1990; Baker et al., 2001; Sulong & Nor, 2008; Uwalomwa et 
al., 2012; Murekefu & Ouma, 2013; Ajanthan ,2013), another study  conducted in Bahrain by 
Khamees, et al, (2015) used two different measurements of performance (ROA) and (Tobin's Q) 
revealed that dividends have a constructive impact on performance when using both 
measurements of performance. However; Gill and Tibrewala (2010) found a negative 
relationship. Kapoor et al. (2010) and Fersio, et al. (2004) found an insignificant association 
between dividends and performance. 
 
Based on the presented literature, we could develop the following hypothesis in order to report 
on the Impact of Dividends on Firm’s Performance, by applying the four suggested measures of 
Firm’s Performance (Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and NPM). 
 
H02: There is no any impact of Dividends on the performance of Jordanian manufacturing 
companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. 
 
Data gathering and research methodology 
 
This study selects all 67 manufacturing companies listed on ASE. In order to test the study 
hypotheses and to achieve its objectives, the annual financial reports and other related data of the 
study sample during the period 2011 to 2015 were analyzed. To diagnose and address the 
differences in results when using each one of the agreed measures and to assess the relevance of 
each one to justify variant results found by previous studies; our study used Tobin's Q along with 
other relevant accounting measures (ROA, ROE, and NPM) as interpreters of firm’s 
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performance. We run the regression analysis, ANOVA and Coefficient Analysis to provide new 
empirical evidence on whether and in what way choice of measure of ownership structure (MO 
and CO) and Dividends (DYLD) might impact the firm’s performance. Also; four control 
variables were added to the model (DEBT RATIO, ASSETS TURNOVER, TOTAL ASSETS 
and EPS). The three main independent variables (MO, CO, and DYLD) were added, one by one, 
to the four different sets of control variables, and their behavior is then compared to the 
regression coefficient analysis.  
The Study variables 
 
The study aims to figure out the impact of ownership structure and dividends on firm’s 
performance Thus, Ownership structure and dividends are reflected as independent variables, 
while the firm’s performance is the dependent variable. The study applies four different 
acceptable measurement tools (Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and NPM) as interpreters of a firm’s 
performance.  
 




Firm’s performance is the dependent variable which has been measured in other empirical 
studies by using various accounting measures.  (Sher & Yang, 2005), and (Shu-Ching & 
Wenching, 2006) all used (ROA, ROE, EPS, ROS, and NPM), while; Tobin’s Q was used by 
(Morck et al., 1988, 2000), (McConnell and Servaes, 1990) and (Khamis et al., 2015) as an 
interpreter of firm’s performance. Firm’s performance is expressed by the following four 
interpreters (Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and NPM). 
 
Tobin's Q  
 
Tobin's Q for individual companies is thought of like the (market value of equity and liabilities) / 
(book value of equity and liabilities). Obtaining the book value of equity and liabilities is 
generally easier than getting the market valuation due to changes in daily market valuations. 
Sulong and Nor (2008) reproduced the calculation of the modified version of Tobin's q ratio as a 
measure of a firm's performance. This measure is broadly used in many kinds of literature; such 
as (Mehran, 2008; Rathinasamy et al., 2000; Wolfe & Sauaia, 2003).  
The simplified form of Tobin's Q ratio is depicted as follows: 
 
Simple Q = (Market Value of Equity +Total DEBT) / Book value of TOTAL ASSETS 
 
When Tobin’s Q ratio is greater than one shows that the market values the firm as being worthy 
(Faizah, 2006). 
 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
ROE is an accounting based measure of performance in corporate governance research. (ROE) is 
an important interpreter of the performance. Further; Zeitun and Tian (2007) found that ROA 
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and ROE are the most significant measures used by analysts. It measures the profitability of 
funds invested by stockholders; this measure is formed as follows:   
 
ROE = Annual Net Income /Stockholders’ equity. 
Return on Assets  
ROA is used to measure a firm´s income in relation to all other assets. It measures the 
effectiveness of economic resources allocated to the business. Wu and Cui (2002) afford that 
there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm’s performance 
calculated by ROA. 
 
 The ROA is calculated by dividing the net income by total assets deployed in the business over 
the reporting period. It is presented as: 
ROA = Net Income / Total Assets. 
Net profit After-Tax Margin - NPM 
NPM is a financial performance ratio, calculated by dividing net income after taxes by net sales. 
A firm's NPM is an essential measure because it indicates the amount of earned profit per dollar 
of sales. This ratio is presented as follows: 
NPM = NPAT/ NET SALES 
Based on our review of performance measures, and In order to answer the third question of the 
study; this study developed the following hypothesis: 
 
H03: There aren't any performance measures defined as a proxy for a firm’s performance. 
 




The study used two main independent variables which are Management Ownership (MO) and 
Concentrated Ownership (CO). In this study; we defined Concentrated Ownership as percentage 
shares held by the top five shareholders. A motive for using a five percent threshold is likely to 
be the Jordanian disclosure requirements by the Jordan Securities Commission. Specifically, the 
five largest shareholders are considered to be major shareholders irrespective of their share sizes. 
Concentration measures are usually more effective in terms of both predicting powers of the 
model and the significance level of their regression coefficient. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
disputed that concentrated ownership would cut the agency cost, and later rising the firm’s 
performance. Also; Wu and Cui (2002) provided that there is a positive relationship between 
concentrated ownership and firm’s performance measured in term of ROA. While; Manawaduge 
et al. (2009) revealed that ownership concentration did not show any effect on performance.  
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The study used the top five Concentrated Ownership (CR5) model as follows (Sulong and Nor 
2008):  
 
                          5 
CR 5 = Top1 / ∑ γi     
                       i=1 
 
Whereas Management Ownership is known as percentage shares held by managers, CEOs, etc. A 
lot of literature provided the shares owned by managers form the management ownership (Morck 




Dividends were principally measured by dividends yield (dividends paid per share -to- market 
share price ratio). That is, DYLD = DPS / MPS. The dividend yield was considered instead of the 
payout ratio for two reasons. Firstly, the denominator in dividends yield is share price compared 
to an accounting measure (net income). Secondly, to evade difficulties of negative payout ratios 
are caused by negative income or excessively high payout ratios resulting from income being 
close to zero (Schooley and Barney, 1994).  
 
Control variables  
 
Debt Ratio and Assets Turnover 
 
Debt Ratio and Assets Turnover are taken as control variables. Debt Ratio (Debt) is functioned 
out as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  Jensen (1986) strains the significance of debt in 
restrictive managerial choice over the use of free cash flow; Stulz (1988) and Bhabra (2007) 
propose an opposite relationship between leverage and firm’s performance. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) disputed that debt is an adjusting tool that eases agency problems between management 
and other shareholders; therefore, leverage impacts firm’s performance through monitoring 
activities by debt holders, thus our study presented it as total debt divided by total assets to form 
the Debt Ratio (Debt).  
 
Assets turnover (AT) is calculated by dividing total sales by total assets. This control variable 
was used by (Sulong and Nor, 2008) (Hamid Ulla et al., 2012) and (Khamees et al. 2015).  
 
Firm Size   
 
Our study considered firm size because it is likely that big firms seem attractive to stockholders. 
Large firms may pay high dividends as discussed in Redding (1997). Short and Keasey (1999) 
found that firm size has an effect on a firm's performance, while; Bhabra (2007) reveals that firm' 
performance is negatively associated with firm size. Many previous studies have used total assets 
to represent firm size (Khamees et al., 2015) and (Hamid Ullad et al. 2012). Our study used total 
assets (FSIZE) as the indicator of firm size. 
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Earnings per Share (EPS) 
 
Earnings per share (EPS) ratio is calculated by dividing the income less preferred dividends by 
the weighted average number of outstanding common shares. This measurement is used by 
(Sulong and Nor, 2008), (Kumar and Sopariwala, 1992), and (Ahmed and Khababa, 1999).  
Khamees et al. (2015) provided that EPS has an observed noticed impact on performance, while 
Sulong and Nor  (2008) provided a negative insignificant effect of EPS on Firm’s performance 
using T’Q. Our study used EPS to address the conflicting results of previous studies. 
 
The EPS = net income less preferred dividends / weighted average number of outstanding 
common shares. 
Based on our review of control variables and the way they were deployed, this study developed 
the following hypothesis to answer the fourth question of the study. 
 
H04: There is no any impact of control variables on the performance of Jordanian 
manufacturing companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. 
 
The study regression model: 
 
Based on the above-explained variables of the study; we are able to develop the following 
empirical model: 
 
FPit (Tobin’s Q) = αit+ β1 MOit+ β2 COit+ β3 DYLDit + β4 Debt + β5 ATit + β6 FSIZE + β7 
Prof + εit Eq  
 
FPit (ROA) = αit+ β1 MOit+ β2 COit+ β3 DYLDit + β4 Debt + β5 ATit + β6 FSIZE + β7 Prof 
+ εit Eq  
 
FPit (ROE) = αit+ β1 MOit+ β2 COit+ β3 DYLDit + β4 Debt + β5 ATit + β6 FSIZE + β7 Prof 
+ εit Eq  
 
FPit (NPM) = αit+ β1 MOit+ β2 COit+ β3 DYLDit + β4 Debt + β5 ATit + β6 FSIZE + β7 Prof 




FP         = Firm Performance represented by Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and NPM. 
MO        = Managerial Ownership  
CO         = Concentrated Ownership  
DYLD    = DPS / MPS (Dividends per share divided to Market Price per Share  
Debt      = Debt Ratio = Total Debts / Total Assets. 
AT         = Assets Turnover 
FSIZE   = Total assets in thousands  
Prof       = represented by EPS. 
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 α           = the constant term 
 Β          = coefficient  
 ε          = Error term and Subscript  
(i,t)      = the value of the panel data variable “i” in year “t”. 
 
Empirical Analysis  
 
The empirical analysis consists of regression, ANOVA, and the coefficient for each variable. The 
package ‘Statistical Package for Social Sciences’ (SPSS) 18.0 Version was deployed in order to 
analyze the data.  
 
Multicollinearity test  
 
This study tested multicollinearity between independent variables; it was found that Inflation 
factor (VIF) value is less than 5 and above 0.1 so that there are no indicators of multicollinearity 
between independent variables. The test for multicollinearity was conducted before analyzing the 
regression model. As mentioned by Field (2000), this test is important because multicollinearity 
can influence the parameters of a regression model.  
 
Empirical Analysis and Discussion 
 
Table 1: Regression Analysis 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable Model R R Square Adjusted R Square St. Error 
Tobins’ Q MO 1 .448a .200 .191 .64707260592 
ROA MO 1 .729a .531 .526 7.1965219547 
ROE MO 1 .175a .031 .019 16.844465414 
NPM MO 1 .449a .202 .191 .41232555470 
Tobins’ Q CO 1 .507a .257 .248 .62265940783 
ROA CO 1 .770a .592 .587 5.8113902894 
ROE CO 1 .183a .034 .021 17.269027239 
NPM CO 1 .470a .221 .210 .35389045225 
Tobins’ Q DYLD 1 .442a .196 .186 .64826008931 
ROA DYLD  1 .733a .537 .531 7.1676083852 
ROE DYLD 1 .178a .032 .020 16.877145693 
NPM DYLD 1 .443a .196 .185 .41499735022 
 
Table 2: ANOVA Analysis 
Dependent Variable Independent variable Mean Square F Sig. 
Tobins’ Q MO 8.544 20.405 .000b 
ROA MO 4781.010 92.315 .000b 
ROE MO 730.056 2.573 .026b 
NPM MO 3.200 18.824 .000b 
Tobins’ Q CO 10.372 26.751 .000b 
ROA CO 3785.342 112.084 .000b 
ROE CO 801.246 2.687 .021b 
NPM CO 2.552 20.375 .000b 
Tobins’ Q DYLD 8.275 19.690 .000b 
ROA DYLD 4828.700 93.990 .000b 
ROE DYLD 754.025 2.647 .023b 
NPM DYLD 3.104 18.021 .000b 
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According to above tables (1 and 2); this study found high consistency between regression and 
ANOVA analysis, it is found that MO, CO, and DYLD have the highest correlation with the 
firm’s performance which measured by ROA when comparing with other among other 
independent variables. What the results mean is that 53.1%, 59.2 % and 53.7% respectively; of 
the variance (R-Square) in the extent of dependent variable has been significantly explained by 
the independent variables (MO, CO, and DYLD). Furthermore; F- Test showed that MO, CO, 
and DYLD have the highest significant impact on firm's performance measured in terms of ROA 
(92.315 %, 112.084 %, and 93.990%) respectively.  
 
This result could be explained of that when the ownership of outstanding shares is concentrated 
by management, and top shareholders will motivate and drive them to concentrate on utilizing 
assets as a measure of good financial performance which will positively increase their 
compensation, dividends, and returns as they are jointly accountable to the board and other minor 
investors for utilizing assets. In addition to that; concentrated ownership by management and top 
shareholders will lead them to feel that the firm is their own investment by which they will work 
together to increase (ROA) as a financial measure of firm’s performance by directing and 
affecting the operational and financial policies and decisions to ensure the highest level of return 
on invested assets in the firm.  
 
On the other hand; DYLD plays a significant positive role on the firm's performance measured 
by the return on assets of that DYLD encourages both management and top shareholder to utilize 
the usage of invested assets to ensure they will get more payout ratio out of achieved return, in 
other words; DYLD motivates management and top shareholders to manage and operate the 
invested assets in a productive manner to get more cash proceeds for their investments in the 
firm. Also; Shareholder’s wealth is maximized through effective investment strategies, financed 
by an optimal capital structure. Furthermore; this study found that MO, CO, and DYLD have a 
significant positive correlation with firm's performance which measured by Tobin's Q and NPM. 
While the MO, CO and DYLD also have an insignificant positive correlation with ROE as a 
proxy of firm's performance (R Square MO =3.1 %, CO = 3.4 % and DYLD = 3.2%) and (F-Test 
MO = 2.573 %, CO = 2.687 % and DYLD = 2.647 %) respectively. So, the correlation of MO, 
CO, and DYLD with firm's performance measures (ROA, Tobin's Q and NPM) is still significant 
positive, but explicitly more than the significant correlation with ROE.  
 
A company's after-tax profit margin (NPM) is important because it tells investors the percentage 
of money a company actually earns per dollar of sales. These results are in line with Xu and 
Wang (1999),  Ajanthan, (2013)  and Sulong and Nor (2008).  
 
Also; Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), Chen et al. (2005), Vein Krivogorsky (2006), Cornett et al. 
(2008) and Jaafar & El-Shawwa (2009) found a positive relation between ownership 
concentration and firm’s performance.  On the contrast; the study results disagree with the study 
of Severin (2001). Also; the result of this study is lined with Khamees et al., (2015). 
  
The results of this study are lined with Uwalomwa et al., (2012),  Murekefu and Ouma, (2013), 
Ajanthan, (2013), and Priya and Nimalathasan, (2013), all of these studies revealed that dividend 
payout has significant impact on a firm's performance, also; when managers have a significant 
ownership (MO) they will influence the dividends policy in order to give a good indicator of a 
Al Sa’eed | The Impact of Ownership Structure and Dividends on Firm’s Performance  
117 
firm's performance especially when this policy meets the top shareholders expectations, this 
result is in line with Zeckhauser and Pound’s  (1990) argument as they mentioned that dividend 
policy could be used as a signal for the firm's performance. However; our results disagree with 
Gill and Tibrewala, (2010). 
 
In conclusion; this study found that (MO. CO and DYLD) have the highest positive correlation 
with and significant positive impact on firm’s performance when measured in terms of ROA, 
while the least positive correlation with firm’s performance was ROE. In addition to that; MO, 
CO, and DYLD have also a positive significant correlation and impact on firm's performance 
when measured in terms of Tobin’s Q and NPM.  
 













B Std. Error Beta 
Tobins’ Q 
(Constant) .948 .077  12.351 .000 
MO -2.149 .809 -.118 -2.658 .008 
DEBT RATIO .006 .153 .002 .037 .971 
ASSETS TURNOVER -.495 .089 -.254 -5.537 .000 
TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE) -2.049E-010 .000 -.051 -.824 .410 
EPS( PROF) .783 .120 .430 6.537 .000 
ROA 
(Constant) -2.196 .854  -2.573 .010 
MO 21.537 8.992 .082 2.395 .017 
DEBT RATIO -1.152 1.697 -.024 -.679 .497 
ASSETS TURNOVER 5.440 .994 .193 5.472 .000 
TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE) -2.061E-008 .000 -.355 -7.460 .000 
EPS( PROF) 22.274 1.332 .843 16.725 .000 
 (Constant) 3.537 1.998  1.770 .077 
 MO 6.869 21.048 .016 .326 .744 
 ROE DEBT RATIO -8.484 3.972 -.111 -2.136 .033 
 ASSETS  TURNOVER -2.692 2.327 -.059 -1.157 .248 
 TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE) -7.833E-009 .000 -.083 -1.211 .226 
 EPS( PROF) 5.819 3.117 .135 1.867 .063 
NPM 
(Constant) -.136 .059  -2.313 .021 
MO .918 .519 .082 1.769 .078 
DEBT RATIO -.346 .102 -.166 -3.392 .001 
ASSETS TURNOVER .279 .064 .208 4.363 .000 
TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE) -2.680E-010 .000 -.110 -1.672 .095 
EPS( PROF) .372 .077 .331 4.803 .000 
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Table 4: Coefficient Analysis – Concentrated Ownership (CO) 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
Tobins’ Q 
(Constant) .407 .120  3.400 .001 
DEBT RATIO -.108 .152 -.033 -.713 .477 
ASSETS TURNOVER -.486 .090 -.245 -5.392 .000 
TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE) -4.483E-010 .000 -.115 -1.836 .067 
EPS( PROF) .822 .117 .459 7.055 .000 
CO .008 .002 .252 5.561 .000 
ROA 
(Constant) -1.640 1.119  -1.466 .143 
DEBT RATIO -1.190 1.417 -.029 -.840 .401 
ASSETS TURNOVER 4.838 .842 .194 5.747 .000 
TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE) -1.860E-008 .000 -.379 -8.163 .000 
EPS( PROF) 20.358 1.088 .903 18.718 .000 
CO .007 .014 .015 .462 .645 
 (Constant) 6.121 3.324  1.841 .066 
 DEBT RATIO -8.717 4.209 -.111 -2.071 .039 
ROE ASSETS TURNOVER -2.681 2.502 -.056 -1.072 .285 
 TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE) -7.056E-009 .000 -.075 -1.042 .298 
 EPS( PROF) 5.849 3.232 .134 1.810 .071 
 CO -.038 .042 -.046 -.899 .369 
NPM 
(Constant) -.185 .074  -2.482 .014 
DEBT RATIO -.430 .090 -.236 -4.781 .000 
ASSETS TURNOVER .221 .056 .187 3.918 .000 
TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE) -3.075E-010 .000 -.147 -2.185 .030 
EPS( PROF) .330 .067 .342 4.934 .000 
CO .002 .001 .121 2.497 .013 
 
Table 5: Coefficients   Analysis – Dividends Payout (DYLD)  




 B Std. Error Beta 
Tobins’ Q 
(Constant) .975 .080  12.144 .000 
DEBT RATIO -.071 .159 -.022 -.449 .654 
ASSETS TURNOVER -.467 .091 -.241 -5.107 .000 
TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE) -2.910E-010 .000 -.073 -1.146 .253 
EPS( PROF) .867 .126 .478 6.883 .000 
DYLD -2.519 1.195 -.109 -2.108 .036 
ROA 
(Constant) -2.765 .887  -3.116 .002 
DEBT RATIO .061 1.753 .001 .035 .972 
ASSETS TURNOVER 4.879 1.011 .173 4.827 .000 
TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE) -1.892E-008 .000 -.326 -6.739 .000 
EPS( PROF) 20.750 1.393 .785 14.895 .000 
DYLD 43.631 13.214 .129 3.302 .001 
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Also, according to the coefficient table 3; it is found that t _values for the independent variables 
(MO, CO, and DYLD) (-2.658, 5.561 and -2.108 ) respectively and control variables (ASSETS 
TURNOVER, and EPS)( -5.537 and 6.537 )  are significant at 0.05 levels, which mean there is 
significant effect of each of them on the firm’s performance measured by Tobin’s Q, while it's 
found that DEBT RATIO and TOTAL ASSETS have insignificant coefficient with Tobin's Q as 
a proxy for firm's performance (Sig, 0.971 and .410) which means that Management with 
significant ownership preferring a stable level of debt ratio and invested assets high level of debt 
and assets would decrease the ROA, ROE, and NPM when fixing other variables, also; this result 
can explain the insignificant coefficient with Tobin's Q when Management concentrating on 
constant level of debt and assets. At the end; these results are referred to that Management with 
concentrated ownership of outstanding shares is preferring high level of assets turnover and low 
level of Asset (SIZE) comparing to the total debt, which reflected by insignificant coefficient of 
DEBT RATIO (Sig, .497) with Tobin’s Q, and significant coefficient of ASSETS TURNOVER 
with Tobin’s Q. EPS has a significant coefficient with Tobin’s Q as MO prefers high EPS which 
positively affects the market value of the firm (MVE). Similarly; (MO ,DYLD) and control 
variables (ASSETS TURNOVER, size and EPS)  are significant at 0.05 levels, which mean that 
there is significant effect of each of them on the firm’s performance measured by ROA which 
means that these independent variables are good predictors of firm’s performance when 
measured by ROA, while CO does not have that significant coefficient (sig, .645)  with ROA, 
since this ratio is related directly to the management financial performance as management 
ownership concentration would affect assets operating and financial policies, also; increased 
assets turnover means that management is utilizing the firm’s assets (size)  in generating sales 
and returns as well. Consistent with correlation and ANOVA analysis in table 1 and 2 above; it's 
found that (MO, CO, and DYLD) and all other control variables do not have a significant 
coefficient with ROE except for DEBT RATIO (.033, .039, and .024) among the three study 
variables (MO, CO, and DYLD) respectively; only the DEBT RATIO has a significant 
coefficient of firm's performance measured by ROE, increased DEBT RATIO means that the 
firm is utilizing the financial leverage to increase ROE.  
 
On the other hand; it’s found that t _values for (CO) and the control variables (DEBT RATIO, 
ASSETS TURNOVER, TOTAL ASSETS and EPS) are significant at 0.05 levels, which mean 
there is a significant impact of each of them on the firm’s performance measured in terms of  
NPM. (CO) and control variables (DEBT RATIO, ASSETS TURNOVER, TOTAL ASSETS and 
 (Constant) 4.164 2.089  1.993 .047 
 DEBT RATIO -9.379 4.128 -.122 -2.272 .024 
 ASSETS TURNOVER -2.306 2.380 -.050 -.969 .333 
  ROE TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE) -8.846E-009 .000 -.094 -1.338 .182 
 EPS( PROF) 6.511 3.280 .151 1.985 .048 
 DYLD -22.581 31.114 -.041 -.726 .468 
NPM 
(Constant) -.120 .059  -2.018 .044 
DEBT RATIO -.349 .106 -.167 -3.290 .001 
ASSETS TURNOVER .267 .067 .199 3.999 .000 
TOTAL ASSETS( SIZE) -2.612E-010 .000 -.107 -1.590 .113 
EPS( PROF) .355 .082 .315 4.325 .000 
DYLD .460 .840 .030 .548 .584 
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EPS) are considered good predictors of firm’s performance (NPM) which means also that 
increased financial leverage and EPS reflected in NPM as a proxy of firm’s performance. While 
the control variable (TOTAL ASSETS –Size) has an insignificant coefficient with firm’s 
performance measured by NPM when inserting the independent variables (MO and DYLD) (sig, 
.093 and 0.113) respectively, this exceptional result is referring to that MO is preferring a low 
size of total assets and would affect inversely the ROA, ROE and DYLD as well.   Our results 
are lined with McConnell and Servaes (1990), a study by Xu and Wang (1999) showed that the 
mix and concentration of stock ownership are significant in explaining the firm's performance.  
 
As for robustness of performance of the control variables, their regression coefficients are quite 
consistent in terms of both sign and significance level, across the four firm’s performance 
measures; MO has a significant positive relationship (t= 2.395, sig, =0.017) with firm’s 
performance measured by ROA, significant negative relationship (t= -2.658, sig, 0.008) with 
firm’s performance measured by Tobin’s Q, while MO shows insignificant positive relationship 
with ROE and NPM. While CO shows a significant positive relationship (t =5.561, sig, 0.000) 
and (t =2.497, sig,   (0.013) with firm’s performance measured by Tobin’s Q and NPM 
respectively, this result is lined with Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) in which they found a 
positive relation between ownership concentration and firm performance. while it shows an 
insignificant positive relationship with ROA and insignificant negative relationship with ROE.  
Morck, et al. (1988) found no significant relationship in the linear regressions they estimate 
when using Tobin's Q and accounting profit rate as alternative measures of performance.  
 
DYLD shows a significant negative relationship (t= -2.108, sig, .036) with Tobin's Q, a 
significant positive relationship (t= 3.302, sig, 0.001) with ROA, and insignificant negative and 
insignificant positive relationship with ROE and NPM respectively. Our results are in line with 
those of Uwalomwa et al., (2012), Murekefu and Ouma, (2013), Ajanthan, (2013), Priya and 
Nimalathasan, (2013) and Khamees et al., (2015). 
 
The major findings of the study are: First, MO and DYLD have a significant positive impact on 
firm’s performance when deploying ROA as a proxy of firm's performance, and have a 
significant negative impact on firm's performance when using Tobin’s Q. CO reported a 
significant positive impact on a firm’s performance when deploying Tobin’s Q and NPM. 
Second; MO and DYLD collectively have an insignificant positive impact on firm’s performance 
when deploying NPM. Also; MO reported an insignificant positive impact on firm’s 
performance when deploying ROE as a proxy of a firm’s performance, while CO reported an 
insignificant positive impact on firm’s performance when employing ROA.  
 
Finally, CO and DYLD reported an insignificant negative impact on firm’s performance when 
deploying ROE as a proxy of firm’s performance, which means that NPM and ROE indicators 
are less representative as proxies of firm’s performance at all, while; ROA indicator is more 
representative as a proxy of a firm’s performance through this analysis. 
 
Additionally, the study found that the control variable EPS has a significant positive impact on a 
firm's performance when deploying ROA, Tobin's Q and NPM as proxies of the firm's 
performance. The control variable Assets turnover reported a significant positive impact on a 
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firm's performance when deploying ROA and NPM. Finally; the control variable Debt ratio 
reported a significant positive impact on a firm's performance when deploying ROA.  
 
On the other hand; the control variable Total Assets reported a significant negative impact on 
firm’s performance when deploying ROA, ROE, and NPM, while the control variable Debt ratio 
reported a significant negative impact on firm's performance when deploying ROE and NP. 
However; the control variable Assets turnover showed a significant negative impact on a firm’s 
performance when using Tobin’s Q. Table 6 summarizes the study results. 
 






















Measure as a 





ROA MO, DYLD  Significant positive ROA H01, H02, and H03: Reject 
Tobin’s Q MO, DYLD  Significant negative Tobin’s Q H01, H02, and H03: Reject  
Tobin’s Q, 
NPM 
CO  Significant positive  Tobin’s Q  H01, H02, and H03: Reject  
ROA, Tobin’s 
Q, and NPM 
 EPS Significant positive ROA and 
Tobin’s Q 
H04 and H03: Reject 
ROA, NPM  Assets Turnover Significant positive ROA H04 and H03: Reject 
ROA  Debt Ratio Significant positive ROA H04 and H03: Reject 
ROA, ROE, 
NPM  
 Total Assets Significant negative ROA H04 and H03: Reject 
ROE, NPM  Debt Ratio Significant negative Not H04 and H03: Reject 




This study aimed to provide empirical evidence from Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) to address 
the impact of ownership structure and dividends on firm’s performance of Jordanian 
Manufacturing Companies listed on ASE. A sample of firms over the recent six-year period 
(2010-2015) was selected. The data was derived from the annual financial reports of listed firms. 
To diagnose and address the differences in results when using each one of the agreed measures 
and to assess the relevance of each one to justify variant results found by previous studies; our 
study used Tobin's Q along with other relevant accounting measures (ROA, ROE, and NPM) as 
interpreters of firm’s performance. We run the regression analysis, ANOVA and Coefficient 
Analysis to provide new empirical evidence on whether and in what way choice of measure of 
ownership structure (MO and CO) and Dividends (DYLD) might impact the firm’s performance. 
Also; four control variables were added to the model (DEBT RATIO, ASSETS TURNOVER, 
TOTAL ASSETS and EPS). The three main independent variables (MO, CO, and DYLD) were 
AABFJ  |  Volume 12, no. 3, 2018 
 
122 
added, one by one, to the four different sets of control variables, and their behavior is then 
compared to the regression coefficient analysis.  
 
In conclusion; our study provided an empirical evidence and rejected the null hypotheses and 
accepted the alternative ones; which means that ownership structure and dividends impact the 
firm’s performance of the selected sample, the study variables (MO, CO, and DYLD) are 
significant predictors of firm's performance in most cases, and the control variables (EPS and 
Total Assets) are also significant predictors of firm's performance, while (Assets Turnover and 
Debt Ratio)  are moderate predictors of firm's performance. In addition to that, the study found 
that (ROA) and (Tobin's Q) are the most representative indicators as proxies of the firm's 
performance, while NPM is still moderate. The study concludes that the study variables were 
well selected and seemed to be good predictors of firm's performance so that all of them have an 
impact on firm' performance.   
 
At the end; the study recommends considering those variables for any future research, more so; 
another control variable could be promoted to better predicting the firm's performance such as 
governance mechanisms, board structure, management competence, motivation-based payment 
structure, capital structure and external and internal auditing. 
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